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Abstract
In this work we analyse critically Griffiths’s example of the classical superluminal mo-
tion of a bug shadow. Griffiths considers that this example is conceptually very close to
quantum nonlocality or superluminality,i.e. quantum breaking of the famous Bell inequality.
Or, generally, he suggests implicitly an absolute asymmetric duality (subluminality vs. su-
perluminality) principle in any fundamental physical theory.It, he hopes, can be used for a
natural interpretation of the quantum mechanics too. But we explain that such Griffiths’s
interpretation retires implicitly but significantly from usual, Copenhagen interpretation of
the standard quantum mechanical formalism. Within Copenhagen interpretation basic com-
plementarity principle represents, in fact, a dynamical symmetry principle (including its
spontaneous breaking, i.e. effective hiding by measurement). Similarly, in other fundamental
physical theories instead of Griffiths’s absolute asymmetric duality principle there is a dy-
namical symmetry (including its spontaneous breaking, i.e. effective hiding in some of these
theories) principle. Finally, we show that Griffiths’s example of the bug shadow superluminal
motion is definitely incorrect (it sharply contradicts the remarkable Roemer’s determination
of the speed of light by coming late of Jupiter’s first moon shadow).
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In this work we shall analyze critically presentations, discussions and implicitly suggested orig-
inal solutions of some significant conceptual problems of the quantum mechanics foundation given
in the significant book of David Griffiths Introduction to Quantum Mechanics [1] .Precisely, we shall
analyze Griffiths’s suggestion on the conceptual analogy between quantum mechanics (quantum
nonlocality or superluminality, i.e. quantum breaking of the famous Bell inequality) and classi-
cal mechanics (classical (nonquantum) superluminal motion of a bug shadow along a sufficiently
distant screen). This analogy, Griffiths hopes, implies the existence of a absolute asymmetric
duality(causal subluminality, i.e. locality vs. acausal superluminality, i.e. nonlocality) principle
not only in the quantum mechanics but in practically all fundamental physical theories (classical
mechanics, theory of relativity, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory). Further we shall
compare such Griffiths’s absolute asymmetric duality principle with ”relativistic and symmetrical”
suppositions and statements of the usual, Copenhagen (Bohr-Heisenberg’s) interpretation of the
standard quantum mechanical formalism. It will be demonstrated that Griffiths’s and Copenhagen
conceptual view points are principally different. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that concep-
tual basis of practically all fundamental physical theories (classical mechanics, theory of relativity,
quantum mechanics and quantum field theory) represents instead of the Griffiths’s absolute asym-
metric duality principle a ”relativistic” dynamical symmetry (including its spontaneous breaking,
i.e. effective hiding in some of these theories) principle. Finally, we shall prove that Griffiths’s
example of the classical superluminal bug shadow motion is definitely inconsistent. It is not hard
to see that given example contradicts sharply the remarkable Roemer’s determination of the speed
of light by coming late of Jupiter’s first moon shadow. Subtle distinctions between absolute asym-
metric (Griffiths’s and other) and ”relativistic and symmetric” (Copenhagen) interpretations of
the quantum mechanics, which are presented here, can be very interesting for the students for a
better understanding of the basical concepts in the modern physics.
In the afterward of his above-mentioned book David Griffiths presents simply and clearly
famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, EPR [2] (that states that quantum mechanics is consis-
tent but incomplete so that it must be completed with some (subquantum) hidden variables), Bell
inequality [3] (that states that if quantum mechanics is incomplete then it is necessarily inconsis-
tent) and takes notice on Bell inequality breaking by real experiments [4]. These works, Griffiths
concludes, imply the so-called quantum nonlocality, superluminality or (by Einstein’s words [2])
”spooky action-at-a-distance”. Or, generally, it implies, in Griffiths’s opinion, a principal absolute
asymmetric duality (causal subluminal dynamics vs. accusal superluminal influences) not only in
quantum mechanics but in all other fundamental physical theories too.
However this conclusion is not quite accurate even if the term ”quantum nonlocality” is in
a general use. Quite correctly speaking, according to its standard formalism [5] including its
usual, Copenhagen (Bohr-Heisenberg’s) interpretation [6],[7], that are in an excellent agreement
with real experiments [4], quantum mechanics is both, complete and subluminal. It forbids not
only superluminal energy or information transfer but any superluminal action, i.e. influence.
Namely, according to standard quantum mechanical formalism and Copenhagen interpretation
seeming superluminal actions represent noting more than a consequence of an incorrect use of
this formalism. Especially, collapse of the wave function by measurement, as one of the most
fundamental standard quantum mechanical concepts, represents, as it has often been suggested
by Bohr (even if Bohr does not use the word collapse but only measurement, or more generally,
complementarity of the principally different measurements) [6], [7], only a relative but not an
absolute phenomenon. Moreover, Bohr compares the relative character of the collapse within
standard quantum mechanical formalism with the relative character of the space-time in Einstein’s
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general theory of relativity. In this sense at the end of his remarkable comment of EPR paradox
[6] Bohr observes the following :
”Especially, the singular position of measuring instruments in the account of quantum phe-
nomena, just discussed, appears closely analogous to the well-known necessity in relativity theory
of upholding an ordinary description of all measuring processes, including a sharp distinction be-
tween space and time coordinates, although the very essence of this theory is the establishment of
new physical laws, in the comprehension of which we must renounce the customary separation of
space and time ideas. The dependence of the reference system, in relativity theory, of all readings
of scales and clocks may even be compared with essentially uncontrollable exchange of momen-
tum and energy between the objects of measurements and all instruments defining the space-time
system of reference, which in quantum theory confront us with the situation characterized by the
notion of complementarity. In fact this new feature of natural philosophy means a radical revision
of our attitude as regards physical reality, which may be paralleled with the fundamental modi-
fication of all ideas regarding the absolute character of physical phenomenons, brought about by
the general theory of relativity.” (p.701.)
In other words in the general theory of relativity all space-time referential frames at any
space-time point are equivalent or symmetric and none of these frames can be exactly treated
as unique, i.e. absolute (formal existence of the absolute referential frame corresponds,in fact,to
absolute breaking of the general relativistic dynamical symmetry), on the one hand. It means that
symmetric general relativistic dynamics, that is, of course, subluminal, can completely describe
all exact general relativistic phenomenons. On the other hand, at any point of the Riemannian
space-time there is unique local Euclidian referential frame that can be locally approximately, i.e.
effectively treated as the ”absolute” (in this way general relativistic symmetry becomes locally
approximately, i.e. effectively broken, precisely hidden). Also, by a sufficiently small gravitational
field and sufficiently small speeds (ten or many times smaller than the speed of light), a transition
from local Euclidian referential frame in some close to Euclidian frame can be effectively approx-
imated by appearance of the Newtonian inertial forces in given local Euclidian frame. It denotes
the approximate transition from Einstein’s general theory of relativity to Newton’s classical me-
chanics. But for a sufficiently large gravitational field or sufficiently large speeds (comparable
with the speed of light) Newton’s classical mechanics becomes an incorrect approximation of the
Einstein’s general theory of relativity.
Similarly, on the one hand, Bohr suggests that in the standard quantum mechanical formalism,
all bases, representing referential frames in Hilbert space of the states of quantum system are equiv-
alent or symmetric and none of these frames can be exactly treated as unique, i.e. absolute (formal
existence of absolute referential frame corresponds, in fact, to absolute breaking of the quantum
dynamical unitary symmetry,i.e. superposition or to absolute collapse). It means that quan-
tum dynamical state completely (deterministically and objectively) describes the quantum system
in Hilbert space. Also, it means that subluminal unitary symmetric quantum dynamics (that
conserves superposition) can completely describe all exact quantum mechanical phenomenons,
including exact subluminal dynamical interaction between measured quantum object and mea-
surement device.On the other hand, it is possible to apply an approximate, it hybrid description
of this interaction between quantum object and measurement device. By such hybrid description
measurement device is described approximately, i.e. effectively classical mechanically and limit of
a correct use of this approximation is determined by Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations. Only in
respect to so-described measurement device, i.e. relatively quantum object becomes described ef-
fectively quantum mechanically by (relatively) collapsed state from the eigen basis of the measured
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observable preferred by given measurement device. In this way quantum dynamical symmetry, i.e.
superposition, becomes effectively and relatively broken, i.e. effectively hidden by measurement.
More precisely, in Copenhagen interpretation there is a sufficiently explicit suggestion that a
superposition of the weakly interfering wave packets of the measurement device is exactly quantum
dynamically stable so that it stands exactly conserved during time. But given superposition is
effectively classical dynamically globally unstable. For this reason only relatively, i.e. in respect
to effective approximate classical level of the analysis accuracy this superposition turns sponta-
neously (nondynamically and probabilistically) in one locally classical dynamically stable wave
packet with well-known (Born’s) probability. It represents the so-called self-collapse on the classi-
cally effectively described measurement device. Simultaneously, on the measured quantum object,
quantum dynamically exactly correlated with measurement device, relatively,i.e. in respect to
selfcollapsed measurement device, corresponding exact eigen state of the measured observable ap-
pears. It represents relative collapse as effective quantum (but not effective classical) phenomenon
on the measured quantum object. In this way, without any necessity for an absolute collapse on
the classical level of the analysis or in the macroscopic domains, Copenhagen interpretation can
correctly to reproduce all existing experimental facts.
It can be added that Bohr himself observed [7] that many of his or Copenhagen early terms
are not quite accurate but that they can be formalized in a satisfactory way. For example, in early
Bohr’s terminology exact conservation of the quantum dynamical unitary symmetry, or unit norm
of the state, is phenomenologically and simply called ”indivisibility of the quant of action” [6],[7],.
Also, Bohr’s remarkable term ”complementarity” that represents a conceptual generalization of
the quantum particle-wave duality principle does not consider any absolute asymmetric duality
of the particle and wave characteristics that exist in de Broglie’s, Bohm’e etc. hidden variables
theories [8]. Especially, Heisenberg [9] cites his discussions with Bohr which many times expressed
the opinion that (particle-wave) duality, even complementarity represents only a phenomenological
expression. It does not belong to quantum mechanics itself, but it refers to the different possibili-
ties of the (phase) transitions (that cannot be realized simultaneously, i.e. in the same conditions)
from exact quantum in the approximate, i.e. effective classical mechanics. These complementary
transitions occur by different measurements defined only within the corresponding approximation
limits (Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations). A consequent formalization of Bohr’s relative col-
lapse concept is given, for example, in [10]. It is shown that relative collapse can be modeled
by a typical Landau’s continuous phase transition (whose critical values of the order parameters
are determined by Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relations) from exact quantum to the effective, i.e.
approximate classical mechanics.
Really, it is not hard to see that the situation in the quantum mechanics is conceptually en-
tirely analogous to the situation in the quantum field theory, especially in the quantum theory
of the electro-weak interactions [11],[12]. Namely, as it is well-known, the necessity that within
a quantum field theory relativistic locality, i.e. subluminality of the (inter)action is consistently
connected with quantum indeterminacy principle, introduces a strict condition of the renormaliz-
ability of the given quantum field theory. So, roughly speaking, if the quantum mechanics with
indeterminacy principle would admit a nonrelativistic, i.e. nonlocal or superluminal completion
by hidden variables, then the corresponding complete quantum field theories cannot be renoraml-
izable, or quantum field theories in the existing form cannot be possible at all. Renormalizability
in the standard model of the electro-weak interaction is strictly caused by local gauge symmetry
(including its spontaneous (probabilistic) breaking,i.e. effective hiding) of the quantum electro-
weak field dynamics. More precisely, as it is well-known, the exact local gauge symmetry of the
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electro-weak field dynamics does not admit nonzero boson rest mass. Meanwhile, exactly dy-
namically stable locally gauge symmetric electro-weak field is relatively, i.e. in respect to small
perturbation approximation for low energies, dynamically nonstable (perturbation series diverges).
But, in respect to given approximation, an electro-weak field can spontaneously (nondynamically
and probabilistically) turn into one of its equivalently probable local minimums which generates
effectively nonzero boson mass. However, after this spontaneous local gauge symmetry breaking
(effective hiding), except the three massive bosons and one masseless photon, there is, according
to the remarkable Goldstone’s theorem (that would correspond conceptually to Bell’s theorem) an
additional, fifth, masseless Goldstone’s boson, i.e. ”ghost” (spooky or ”ethereal”) boson. It cannot
be eliminated in any absolute way. Any attempt of the absolute elimination of such ”ghost” boson,
that considers explicitly or implicitly the absolute existence of such boson before elimination, leads
explicitly or implicitly to the forbidden absolute (dynamical) breaking of the local gauge symme-
try. Nevertheless it does not mean that in the quantum theory of the electro-weak interaction
there is an absolute asymmetric duality (material bosons vs. ”ghost” boson). Namely, ”ghost”
bosons can be correctly treated as a superfluous degree of the freedom only, i.e. as a possibility
for the choice of a Higgs’s ”rotating” referential frame. After the choice of given referntial frame,
i.e. after application of so-called Higgs’s mechanism, the ”ghost” boson becomes effectively and
relatively eliminated without any exact breaking of the local gauge symmetry of the electro-weak
quantum field dynamics.
Obviously, standard quantum mechanical formalism including its usual Copenhagen interpre-
tation is deeply conceptually analogous to practically all modern fundamental physical theories
(special and general theory of relativity and quantum field theory) where symmetry (including
its spontaneous breaking, i.e. effective hiding by corresponding approximations) represents one of
the most general and significant concepts.
Thus, since collapse is relative, i.e. principally dependent on the limits of the approximate
classical mechanical description of the concrete measurement device, within Copenhagen interpre-
tation of the standard quantum mechanical formalism there is no sense in discussing the collapse
or any corresponding (hidden) variables before concrete measurement. It represents the main
reason why the premises of EPR or Bell inequality cannot be applied at all within Copenhagen
interpretation of the standard quantum mechanical formalism or why there are no superluminal
influences here.
In comparison with other interpretations of the quantum mechanics it can be concluded that
Copenhagen interpretation is much more than a simple,so-called approximationistic interpretation.
In such approximationistic interpretation, eg. [13], roughly speaking, a measurement device is
a quantum mechanically described by a superposition of the weakly interfering wave packets
correlated with eigen states of the measured observable on the measured quantum object. But
since here an approximate classical level of the analysis, discretely (for reason of the Heisenberg’s
indeterminacy relations) different from the exact quantum level of the analysis, is not introduced,
there is no consistent way of modeling of the collapse by an individual measurement. Simply
speaking approximationistic interpretations is incomplete, as it has been pointed out in [14],
since it cannot explain the empirical fact on the ”exact” but not approximate difference between
quantum superposition and quantum mixture on the measured quantum object after measurement.
Also Copenhagen interpretation is principally different than such interpretations that can be
called super-quantum or macroscopic hidden variables interpretations. These interpretations or
theories explain collapse as an absolute phenomenon that appears by an asymmetrically, i.e.
nonunitary extended dynamics by nonlinear terms [15], environment influences [16] etc., in the
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macroscopic domains. Nevertheless, since Bell inequality refers to practically all types of the local
hidden variables, Bell inequality breaking in the real experiments implies that such macroscopic
hidden variables theories must be necessary superluminal. Moreover, such superluminal macro-
scopic hidden variables theories predict not only an incompleteness of the quantum mechanics but,
also, an incompleteness of the classical mechanics and (special and general) relativistic mechanics
in the macroscopic, nonquantum domains.
It can be added that Copenhagen relative collapse interpretation is principally different from
the famous Everett’s relative state (subsystemic branching), i.e. many world interpretation of
the quantum mechanics [17]. Namely, soon after the appearance of EPR and significantly before
Bell inequality appearance, Furry [18] observed quite correctly that in contrast to EPR state-
ment quantum mechanics cannot be both, consistent and incomplete. EPR authors stated that
quantum mechanics cannot differ pure (with superposition) and mixed (without superposition
but with quantum mixture) state on a quantum supersystem that holds distant subsystems. But,
Furry showed that within the standard quantum mechanical formalism there is always a clear
difference between pure and mixed state. It refers not only to a simple quantum system (without
subsystems) but also to a quantum supersystem with near or distant subsystems. For this reason
incompleteness of the quantum mechanics, i.e. existence of a (subsystemic) quantum mixtures
instead of a (supersystemic) quantum superposition, induces inconsistency of the quantum me-
chanics too, and vice versa. Furry’s and similar argumentation applied to Everett’s interpretation
yields following. Within standard quantum mechanical formalism supersystemic superposition is
inconsistent with subsystemic branching.Or Everett’s interpretation is inconsistent with standard
quantum mechanical formalism and existing experimental results [4]. This interpretation can be
consistent only with a hidden variables theory but then it must be necessarily completed by hidden
variables that are not given explicitly in Everett’s original work.Meanwhile, in this case Everett’s
subsystemic branching and relative states lose fundamental character and become an auxiliary
(even superfluous) construction.
Finally Copenhagen relative collapse interpretation is different from von Neumann’s, called
orthodox, interpretation of the quantum mechanics with absolute collapse [5]. It can be observed
and pointed out that there is a very oft opinion, accepted implicitly by Griffiths too,that orthodox
interpretation represents a new, more accurate version of the old, less accurate Copenhagen inter-
pretation. But, in fact, such opinion is incorrect and Copenhagen and orthodox interpretation are
principally different. According to Copenhagen interpretation, as it has been explained, only uni-
tary symmetric quantum dynamics is completely exact and universal. Collapse by measurement
represents only a hybrid, effectively classical on the measurement device and effective and rela-
tive quantum on the quantum object, phenomenon. Simply speaking, Copenhagen interpretation
that proposes quantum mechanics as a theory with spontaneous symmetry breaking (i.e. effec-
tive hiding ) is not old but very modern since it is comparable with contemporary quantum field
theories with spontaneous symmetry breaking. On the contrary, in the orthodox interpretation
the classical approximation is completely eliminated from the quantum dynamics. It, seemingly,
causes a more pure, or completely exact theory than this predicted by Copenhagen interpretation.
But in such ”more pure” (or ”sterile” for the aspect of Copenhagen interpretation) theory there is
none way that the collapse be described by quantum dynamics. For this reason asymmetric (since
it breaks unitary symmetry) collapse, absolutely independent of the unitary symmetric quantum
dynamics,i.e. absolute collapse, must be ad hoc postulated without any clear explanation of its
origin. This von Neumann’s projection postulate represents an extension of the standard quan-
tum mechanical formalism. On the one hand, i.e. quantitatively or numerically, von Neuman’s
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projection postulate corresponds unambiguously to Born’s probabilistic postulate by the getting
of the measurements results on the quantum object. On the other hand, i.e. qualitatively, von
Neumann’s projection postulate states that collapse appears quite exactly and entirely on the
supersystem (measured quantum object + measurement device), but not only by Copenhagen
hybrid description of the same supersystem. In this way within orthodox interpretation there is
an absolute asymmetrical duality, i.e. the difference between unitary symmetric quantum dynam-
ics and absolute asymmetric collapse any of which must be treated as the exact but incomplete.
In this sense quantum mechanics is absolutely exact but necessarily absolutely incomplete too.
Von Neumann suggested implicitly that absolute asymmetric duality of the quantum mechanics
in the orthodox interpretation represents the result of a Cartesian like absolute separation of the
material world (described by quantum dynamics) and immaterial, spiritual world of an Abstract
Ego of the human observer (that generate absolute asymmetric collapse).
EPR authors, that accepted standard quantum mechanical formalism and absolute collapse
postulate, concluded, i.e. suggested that quantum mechanics must be incomplete. But in contrast
to von Neumann’s orthodox interpretation EPR authors suggest implicitly that incompleteness
of the quantum mechanics can be removed by some more general dynamical theory called (sub-
quantum) theory of hidden variables. Word ”subquantum” refers to an implicit supposition that
the level of the hidden variables, in some sense analogous to the quantum field theory level,
lies ”down” quantum mechanical level. Implicitly, EPR authors would admit any, including the
above mentioned macroscopic, or superquantum,hidden variables theory whose level,in some sense
analogous to the classical mechanical level,lies ”up” quantum mechanical level. Nevertheless,
any,subquantum or superquantum, but local hidden variables theory must satisfy Bell inequal-
ity. Meanwhile, since Bell inequality is broken by exact experiments, it means that none, neither
subquantum nor superquantum, local hidden variables theory can exist. On the other hand accep-
tance of a nonlocal hidden variables theory that can to satisfy the existing experimental results,
needs, as it has been discussed, not only a radical revision of the standard quantum mechanical
formalism. It needs, also, a radical revision (even rejection) of the classical mechanics,theory of
relativity and quantum field theory. It represents a very implausible demand (an ”impossible
mission”).
Bell [19] suggested a solution of the hidden variables theory problem by supposition of such
hidden variables, called beables, that, roughly speaking, except their existence, have no other
physical characteristics. Meanwhile, it is not hard to see that then there is no real physical
criterion for differentiation of locality, i.e. subluminality and nonlocallity, i.e. superluminality of
such ”material” beables, or, for differentiation of such ”material” beables and ”imaterial” Abstract
Ego of the human observer. It means only that beable interpretation is equivalently incomplete as
well as orthodox interpretation. In other words, absolute asymmetric duality and incompleteness
problems that appear by extension of the standard quantum mechanical formalism by absolute
asymmetric collapse are equivalent to the same problems that appear by extension of the standard
quantum mechanical formalism by hidden variables.
Also, there are opinions [20 ] that absolute asymmetric duality and incompleteness of the
quantum mechanics does not represent differentiation between onthological, material vs. imma-
terial, concepts, but that it represents a differentiation between onthological and epistemological
concepts. In such, so-called positivistic interpretations of the quantum mechanics onthological
material concepts can be described by unitary symmetric quantum dynamics, but epistemologi-
cal concepts (connected with measurement) stand completely unclear, i.e. quantum dynamically
undescribable,i.e. unexplainable. The difference between positivistic and orthodox interpretation
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is based on a supposition within positivistic interpretation that quantum mechanics (or any other
physical theory) cannot to describe an individual quantum object or individual measurement but
only a statistical quantum ensemble of the quantum objects and measurement results. However
it is obvious that it represents only a change of the one by the other ad hoc postulate that is
not inherent but that is added to standard quantum mechanical formalism. This change does
not cause any diminishing of the principal absolute asymmetric duality, i.e. incompleteness of the
extended quantum mechanics.
All this points clearly that only usual Copenhagen interpretation of the quantum mechanics
represents an interpretation with the relative collapse modeled, in full agreement with general
formalism of the spontaneous symmetry breaking. It, on the one side, without any ”ethereal”,i.e.
metaphysical construction, especially without any superluminal influences, satisfies all existing
experimental results. On the other hand,it corresponds deeply conceptually (with ”relativistic”
dynamical symmetry and its spontaneous breaking as the basical concepts) to practically all other
fundamental physical theories, classical mechanics, theory of relativity and quantum field theory.
On the contrary, all the other above-mentioned interpretations of the quantum mechanics are
either inconsistent with existing experimental results or hold explicitly or iimplicitly absolutely
unremovable ”ethereal”, i.e. metaphysical constructions, i.e. an absolute asymmetric duality.
As an especial form (consequence) of this general absolute asymmetric duality, the duality.i.e.
difference between the subluminal, i.e. dynamical or causal and superluminal, i.e. nondynamical
or acausal influences appear.
Now we shall analyze a more or less implicit original Griffiths’s attempt to solve the problems
of the foundation of the quantum mechanics. He starts form the view point of the interpretations
with absolute asymmetric duality. But he attempts to prove that absolute asymmetric duality,
especially subluminal, i.e. dynamical or causal vs. superluminal, i.e. nondynamical or acausal
absolute duality does not characterize only quantum mechanics but that it characterizes practically
all other fundamental physical theories. If it were be true, then quantum mechanics with its
absolute asymmetric duality would not represent any exception but only an especial example of
the general principle of the absolute asymmetric duality in the nature.
Griffiths states the following :
”Ironically, the experimental confirmation of quantum mechanics came as something of a shock
to the scientific community. But not because it spelled the demise of ”realism” - most physicists
had long since adjusted to this (and for those who could not, there remained the possibility of
nonlocal hidden variables theories, to which Bell’s theorem does not apply). The real shock was the
proof that nature itself is fundamentally nonlocal. Nonlocallity, in the form of the instantaneous
collapse of the wave function (and for matter also in the symmetrization requirement for identical
particles) had always been a feature of the orthodox interpretation, but before Aspect’s experiment
it was possible to hope that quantum nonlocality was somehow a nonphysical artifact of the
formalism, with no detectable consequences. That hope no longer be sustained, and we are obliged
to reexamine our objection to instantaneous action at a distance.” (p.379.)
It can be shortly observed and pointed out that Griffiths, obviously, neglects principal aspects
of Copenhagen interpretation discussed above. Within Copenhagen interpretation nature itself is
fundamentally local while seeming impression on the fundamental nonlocality of the nature is the
consequence of an incorrect postulate on the absoluteness of the collapse. In this way Griffiths’s
conclusions can refer, or must be limited, only to such an interpretation of the quantum mechanics
that ad hoc postulates absolute asymmetric duality in one or in other form.
Further,Griffiths states the following :
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”Why are physicists so alarmed at the idea of superluminal influences? After all, there are
many things that travel faster than light. If a bug flies across the beam of a movie projector, the
speed of its shadow is proportional to the distance to the screen; in principle, that distance can
be as large as you like, and hence the shadow can move at arbitrarily high velocity (Figure A.4.).
However, the shadow does not carry any energy; nor can transmit any message from one point
to another on the screen. A person at point X cannot cause anything to happen at point Y by
manipulating the passing shadows.” (p. 380.)
At first sight it represents only a formal analogy between a classical, strictly nonquantum,
superluminality (by motion of the bug shadow) and quantum (strictly nonclassical) nonlocality
(by Bell inequality breaking). But by a deeper analysis of the cited (and further) Griffiths’s words
it can be concluded that Griffiths points to a principal analogy. Namely Griffiths says :
”Well,let’s consider Bell’s experiment. Does the measurement of the electron influence on
the outcome of the positron measurement? Assuredly it does - otherwise we cannot account for
correlation of the data. But does the measurement of the electron cause a particular outcome for
the positron? Not in any ordinary sense of the word. There is no way the person monitoring the
electron detector could use his measurement to send a signal to the person at the positron detector,
since he does not control outcome of his own instrument (he cannot make a given electron come out
spin up, any more than the person at X can effect the passing shadow of the bug). It is true that
he can decide whether to make a measurement at all, but the positron monitor, having immediate
access only to data as his end of the line, cannot tell whether the electron was measured or not. For
the lists of the data complied at the two ends, considered separately, are completely random. It is
only when we compare the two lists later that we discover the remarkable correlations.” (p.381.)
Obviously,Griffiths compares very seriously the observers of the electron and positron in EPR
paradox and the observers of the bug shadow at X and Y point of the screen. By such comparison
the limitation of the separate, or more accurately subsystemic, measurements on the electron and
positron, that cannot carry energy or information, are seriously analogous to the observation of the
observers at X and at Y . Let is say that, for example, the bug moves up-down quite accidentally
with the speed that has absolute value v but whose direction can be changed practically ”instan-
teneously”. Let is say that,in further admirable simplification, this bug can appear accidentally,
during a small time period, either in a point x corresponding to X or y corresponding to Y . Then
if during given small time interval, the observer at X observes bug shadow he will know that the
observer at Y observes light point, i.e. shadow absence,and vice versa.
However we can ask again if all Griffiths’es statements, that are consistent with orthodox
interpretation or nonlocal hidden variables interpretation,are consistent with Copenhagen inter-
pretation. The answer is again - no, which can be proved by Bohr’s comment of EPR [6], [7].
Simply speaking according to standard quantum mechanical formalism initial local unitary sym-
metric quantum dynamical interaction correlates electron and positron as the quantum subsystems
in the quantum supersystem, [electron+positron]. Or, given supersystem according to initial local
quantum dynamics becomes described by pure correlated quantum state from Hilbert’s space of
the states of supersystem. This state of the supersystem that, according to unitary symmetry,
stands correlated even later when immediate dynamical interaction between distant subsystems
disappear. According to standard quantum mechanical formalism given supersystemic pure cor-
related state must be exactly different from supersystemic mixture of the noncorrelated states.
Simultaneously, it means that given supersystem cannot be exactly split into its subsystems even
if they are distant in sense of the usual space of classical mechanics (Bohr’s indivisibility of the
quant of action!). Namely, fundamental space of the standard quantum mechanical formalism is
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Hilbert’s space but not the usual classical mechanical space of the coordinates. Any explicitly
or implicitly opposite statement leads without standard quantum mechanical formalism. Further
when the electron interacts later exactly quantum dynamically with corresponding measurement
device no absolute collapse on the supersystem appears and for this reason there is no absolute
superluminal influence of the electron on the positron. Given exact quantum dynamical interac-
tion correlates electron+positron supersystem and electron measurement device in a new broader
supersystem, called supersupersystem, [electron+positron+electron measurement device]. Given
supersupersystem according to local quantum dynamical interaction between electron and its mea-
surement device becomes described by a new correlated quantum state from Hilbert’s space of the
states of supersupersystem. According to standard quantum mechanical formalism given super-
supersystemic pure correlated state must be exactly different from supersupersystemic mixture of
the noncorrelated states which means that given supersupersystem cannot be exactly split into its
subsystems, electron, positron and electron measurement device even if some of these subsystems
are distant in sense of the usual classical mechanical space. In this way exact quantum dynamics
by initial interaction between electron and positron or later interaction between electron, more pre-
cisely [electron+positron] and electron measurement device, yields none superluminal influences.
Analogously, exact quantum dynamics by initial interaction between electron and positron or
later interaction between positron, more precisely [electron+positron] and positron measurement
device, yields no superluminal influences.
Further,by a hybrid description of given supersupersystem in which on the effectively classically
described electron measurement device a selfcollapse appears on the supersystem relative collapse
appears as an effective quantum phenomena. Relatively collapsed supersystem becomes effectively
exactly described by a mixture of the noncorrelated quantum states, which admits an effective
separation of the supersystem in the electron and positron. Obviously, here is nothing superluminal
in given selfcollapse and relative collapse, i.e. by corresponding measurement realized by electron
measurement device. Analogously, there is nothing superluminal by measurement by positron
measurement device and corresponding selfcollapse and relative collapse. Also, the comparison
of the results of the measurement of the electron measurement device and positron measurement
device points out that any of given separate, i.e. subsystemic measurements represents only an
incomplete description of corresponding exact description of the quantum dynamical interactions.
In other words, within Copenhagen interpretation comparison of the separate measurements does
not yield any conclusion on a superluminal influences between electron and positron. Given
comparison, within Copenhagen interpretation, points out that any of given separate measurement,
i.e. collapse, must be only a relative but not an absolute phenomenon.
Griffiths ,finally, concludes :
”We are lead, then to distinguish two types of influences: the ”causal” variety, which pro-
duce actual changes in some physical property or receiver, detectable by measurements on that
subsystem alone, and an ”ethereal” kind which do not transmit energy or information, and for
which the only evidence is a correlation in the data taken on the two separate subsystems - a
correlation which by its nature cannot be detected by examing either list alone. Causal influences
cannot propagate faster than light, but there is no compelling reason why ethereal ones should not.
These influences associated with collapse of the wave function are of the latter type, and fact that
they ”travel” faster than light may be surprising, but it is not, after all, catastrophic.”(p.381.)
In other words Griffits states that even if absolute asymmetric quantum duality, dynamical
subluminality vs. superluminality by absolute collapse, seems surprising, it is not catastrophic at
all since quite similar, moreover identical ”catastrophy” exists in the classical, strictly nonquantum,
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motion of the bug shadow. By a simple extension and corresponding examples it seems that it can
be stated that given absolute asymmetric duality exists in practically any fundamental physical
theory.
But from Copenhagen’s view point there is a serious compelling reason for the rejection of Grif-
fiths’s concept of the absolute asymmetric duality.First of all, from Copenhagen’s view point, the
relative character of the collapse within standard quantum mechanical formalism represents such
serious compelling reason. Moreover, as it has been discussed, necessity that by the acceptance
of the absolute asymmetric duality practically all physical theories (classical mechanics, special
and general theory of relativity, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory) must be radically
revised, even completely broken and rejected, represents a more serious compelling reason.
All this causes a serious suspicion about the correctness of Griffiths’s example of the classical
duality and superluminality of the bug shadow motion. Really, it is not hard to see that given
superluminality of the bug shadow contradicts sharply to the remarkable Roemer’s determination
of the speed of light by real astronomical facts on the coming late of the first Jupiter moon shadow.
In further text we shall simply prove that this suspicion is justified, i.e. that Griffiths’s example
of the classical bug shadow superluminal motion is definitely incorrect.
We can imagine that in this second we realize a superluminal influence at the Sun even if,as
it is well-known,light must to propagate from the Earth to the Sun during, approximately, 8
minutes and 20 seconds. But if we do not suggest any causal mechanism for demonstration and
explanation of this influence this influence represents only an unphysical imagination, but not any
physical ”thing that travels faster than light”. Meanwhile Griffiths’s example is not based on an
imagination since it proposes a causal mechanism, i.e. one-to-one correspondence between initial
and final state of the bug shadow. This causal mechanism is based on the well-known principles
of the classical mechanics and optics, even if, formally, the shadow itself does not represent a
classical mechanical body. It would mean that if Griffiths’s example is correct classical mechanics
is not only incomplete, but that it must be definitely incorrect. In some way, Griffiths’s example
in the classical mechanics corresponds to EPR in the quantum mechanics. All this needs a more
accurate analysis, i.e. formalization which will be given in further work .
So, suppose that a projector is a permanent source of the mutually decoherent continuous
light beams that is placed in the coordinate beginning (0, 0) in xOy plane. In any continuous light
beam, i.e. in any direction on the right hand-side of the coordinate beginning continuously filled
by light (photons), the speed of light equals c = 3108m/s.
Suppose that the screen is placed parallel to y − axis at the distance L from the coordinate
beginning along x− axis direction.
Suppose that at the initial time moment a small bug is placed at the point (l, 0) at xOy plane
for 0 < l < L.
Finally, suppose that this bug moves with the constant subluminal speed v, parallel to y−axis
direction till (l , s) point in xOy plane where it will be stopped. It means that the bug will appear
at (l , s) in the time moment
t =
s
v
(1)
According to the introduced suppositions (especially suppositions of the continuity of the light
beams and finite value of the speed of light), the shadow of the bug will appear at (L, 0) point of
the screen only after [0, t1] time interval of the initial coming late,where
t1 =
L
c
(2)
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As it is not hard to see, according to the same suppositions and (1),(2), the complete time of
the motion of the bug shadow from (L, 0) till (L, S), for
S
s
=
L
l
(3)
will be
T = t+ t2 =
s
v
+
((L− l)2 + (S − s)2)
1
2
c
(4)
Here
t2 =
((L− l)2 + (S − s)2)
1
2
c
(5)
represents length of the time interval of the coming late of the bug shadow stopping at (l , s) in
respect to time moment of the bug stopping at (L, S). It is caused by finite value of the speed of
light.
Now it is obvious that the average speed of the bug shadow equals
v′ =
S
T
= c
S
c s
v
+ ((L− l)2 + (S − s)2)
1
2
(6)
It can be simply proved that following is satisfied
S
c s
v
+ ((L− l)2 + (S − s)2)
1
2
≤ 1 (7)
Namely, (6) can be simply transformed in
(S − c
s
v
)2 ≤ (L− l)2 + (S − s)2 (8)
Since v is subluminal, i.e since
c
v
≥ 1 (9)
it follows finally
(S − c
s
v
)2 ≤ (S − s)2 ≤ (L− l)2 + (S − s)2 (10)
so that (7), (8) are satisfied.
Thus,according to (6), (7) it follows generally
v′ ≤ c (11)
which means that the bug shadow moves really with a subluminal speed.
But for a relatively small L and S for which
t≫ t1 (12)
t≫ t2 (13)
T (4) turns approximately in t and v′ (6) turns approximately in
v′ ≃
S
t
(14)
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which,according to (1),(3) , yields
v′ ≃
L
l
v (15)
Obtained expression points out that since L is greater than l the bug shadow speed is greater
than the bug speed. Seemingly, according to (15), for a sufficiently large L, i.e. for
L > l
c
v
(16)
v’ can be superluminal, which represents the original Griffiths’s argumentation. However, for such
a large L expression (15) becomes an incorrect approximation of (6) while (6) itself, according to
(11), represents even in this case a subluminal speed.
Suppose now, quite formally, that that expression (15) is always correct. We shall prove that
in this case there is a causal, but superluminal information transfer by a person, sender of the
information, at X = (L, 0) point and a person, recipient of the information, at Y = (L, S) point.
Namely, suppose that there is a third person, mediator Z close to the bug that governs bug
motion in the following way. It, during the time interval smaller or equal to [0, t], can either have
no influence on the bug motion or stop the given bug before, even significantly before it arrives in
the final point of its trajectory (l , s). In the first case, during time interval smaller or equal to [0, t],
recipient will observe the appearance of the bug shadow at Y , while in the second case during the
same time interval he will not observe given shadow. Simply speaking, there is a possibility of the
information transfer from Z toward Y .
The distance between X and Y equals S, while the distance between X and Z , as it is not
hard to see, is smaller than or equal to ((L − l)2 + s2)
1
2 . Suppose that X during the noted time
interval can inform Z , by an additional way (telephone, radio waves, etc.) with subluminal speed
of the information transfer v′′, either that bug be not disturbed or that bug be stopped before it
arrives in (l , s). This supposition can be expressed by the following condition
((L− l)2 + s2)
1
2
t
≤ v” ≤ c (17)
On the other hand (15),formally treated as an exact expression, under the condition (16) on
v′ superluminality, can be presented in the following way
v′ =
L
l
v =
L
l
s
t
=
Ls
lt
> c (18)
Expressions (16), (17) yield
((L− l)2 + s2)
1
2
t
<
Ls
lt
(19)
or, after simple transformations,
l((L− l)2 + s2)
1
2 < Ls (20)
or, finally,
l2((L− l)2 + s2) < L2s2 (21)
Since condition (16) does not forbid following conditions
L≫ l (22)
13
L≫ s (23)
it follows that (21) can, for (22),(23), approximated by
l2 < s2 (24)
which yields
l < s (25)
Obviously, for an appropriately chosen l and s, condition (25) can be satisfied without any
principal problem. However, according to the introduced suppositions,it means that between
X and Y a superluminal information transfer is possible. (It is not hard to see that analogous
conclusion on the possibility of the superluminal communication between X and Y can be satisfied
even without (22), (23) by the appropriate choice of l , s and L, which will not be discussed in
detail.) For this reason, as well as for the supposed serious analogy between Griffiths’s example and
EPR, inequality (25), or generally,(21), can be considered as the serious analogy of, metaphorically
speaking, an anti-Bell inequality.
In this way it is proved that Griffiths’s example of the classical superluminal motion of a bug
shadow is definitely incorrect. Moreover, it is proved that under a fictitious supposition that
Griffiths’s example is correct between the observer at X and the observer at Y , superluminal and
causal information transfer is possible.
In conclusion we can shortly repeat and point out the following. Except for a hope of some
physicists, there is no compelling reason to suppose that the absolute asymmetric duality (in the
form of an absolute collapse, superluminal hidden variables, etc.) exists in the standard quantum
mechanical formalism or any other fundamental physical theory (classical mechanics, theory of
relativity or quantum field theory). On the contrary, there is a real compelling reason for con-
sideration that standard quantum mechanical formalism ant its usual, Copenhagen interpretation
yield a complete description of the quantum phenomenons. It is in full conceptual agreement
with the foundation of all other modern physical theories. In these theories dynamical symmetry
principle (including its spontaneous breaking, i.e. effective hiding in some of these theories), that
”modificates ”relativistically” all ideas regarding the absolute character of physical phenomena”,
represents one of the most significant basic concept.
The authors gratefully appreciate the helpful discussions and comments provided by Professor
Tristan Hu¨bsch. Authors are very grateful to Sanja Pankovic´ for corrections of the form of this
work.
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